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4 September 1981

West Europe Report

(FOUO 44/81)



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ECONOMIC

SPAIN

GOVERNMENT TO LEAD DRIVE TO IMPROVE INDUSTRIAL EFFICIENCY

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 3 Aug 81 pp 32-33

[Text] A financial housecleaning of crisis-plagued industries is the number one requirement for the Spanish economy to move forward and become part of Europe without falling apart. Almost 2 months after the government passed a decree-law for industrial revamping, the housecleaning of crisis-ridden sectors is under way, albeit with problems. The main problem is that in order to save 7,500 companies and 550,000 jobs, 76,000 people have to be laid off.

Europe began revamping its industrial sectors in 1975-76, when it began seeing that the demand for a series of industrial goods (steel, ships, iron and steel products, capital goods, etc) was plummeting. While our neighbors were engaged in painful surgery on their industries, Spain was stepping on the industrial-ization acceletator and did not want to hear about crises and financial house-cleaning. "We are 3 or 4 years behind Europe, which we hope to make up with our revamping plans by the middle of the decade. We have to keep in mind, however, that what we were concerned about here in 1975-76 was the political transition and that there were no legal labor unions with which to conclude restructuring agreements," commented Enrique Aldama, the undersecretary of industry and energy, to CAMBIO 16.

After the summer of 1980, the country had a whole string of problem-ridden companies, and it began to see clearly that entire sectors (iron and steel, shipbuilding, textiles, motor vehicles, footwear, etc) were going under. For the first time, last November, a minister of industry, Felix Bayon, spoke of the need for a standard procedure for revamping crisis-ridden sectors. The integrated iron and steel industry could not hold out any longer, moreover, and a search began for a compromise solution to its crisis. A reconversion model was developed that has had a full-fledged trial run and has been the basis for the current manageriant. Buth this experience under the country's belt and faced with a vexing industrial disintegration, President Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo promised the 25-F a "costly and difficult" industrial revamping program.

September Amendments

Three more months passed until the decree-law was passed by the Council of Ministers on 5 June. In the interim there was a lengthy dispute among the various ministries and a minimal pact with the Socialists under the overall coordination policy. This pact, whereby the Socialists abstained from voting, enabled the decree-law to be validated in Congress as a bill. "In early September we are going to prepare the amendments for the debate on the industrial revamping bill. Basically, we want to change the system of tax exemptions and subsidies for companies. We are in favor of a short but in-depth debate, inasmuch as the country has a lot at stake in this plan," noted Joaquin Almunia, a deputy and secretary of union policy on the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] Executive Committee.

Without a law but with a decree, the overhaul is under way. The CCOO's [Workers Commissions] approach in several of the sector negotiations (textiles basically) is to delay them until after Congress debates the bill, presumably in September. Its aim is to amend Article 1 of the decree by substituting the wording "shall agree to" for "shall negotiate" in reference to the parties to the negotiation, which would entail introducing the right to veto the decrees.

According to administration and UCD sources, this point is nonnegotiable, their idea being that the government should issue the revamping decree on its own, albeit with prior negotiations among the parties involved. "What the government has to do here, as it is asked to do on many occasions, is make decisions, face up to its responsibilities and govern. The ideal thing would be a revamping plan that business and labor unions can agree on to the greatest extent possible. But if this doesn't happen or if the agreement is not total, we cannot allow the situation of a series of basic sectors to deteriorate further. We would have to do it by decree. In general, I think that all of the sectors are making quite a bit of progress," Industry Under-Secretary Enrique Aldama told this magazine. Three revamping decrees are already in effect: household appliances (20 September 1980), special steels (3 October 1980) and integrated iron and steel (8 May 1981). The three are on the right track, in the administration's view, although the Integrated Iron and Steel Coordinating Commission has a great deal of work ahead of it: there is an initial program of urgent action, and within 10 months it will submit an ambitious investment program up to 1985.

Where there are serious restructuring problems is in the major shipyards, ASESA and ASTANO. The negotiations between the INI [National Institute of Industry] (they are public enterprises) and the labor union confederations flounder on three sore points: the shutdown of work centers, a cutback of 5,000 jobs and wage control. "It's getting hard to reach a comprehensive settlement, and perhaps the only way out is company by company negotiations," commented Enrique Aldama. This could lead to major strife in the fall, given the heavy concentration of centers and the strong presence of the unions.

The small and intermediate shipyards are discussing a reconversion plan with Construnaves and the unions. There is broad common ground, and a joint first draft might be submitted to the administration by September.

Textiles is another problem-ridgen sector. The administration has rehashed an Intertextil reconversion plan by incorporating union proposals and is preparing a decree that will be ready by the end of the month, unless last-minute talks and disagreements move it back to September. The points of disagreement are layoffs (there are 10 percent too many people are on the payrolls), the establishment of a fourth shift and seasonal work.

Footwear is not on the list of sectors affected by the revamping decree, inasmuch as it does not need financial or tax breaks or payroll cutbacks, but rather export promotion measures and an in-depth technological and commercial overhaul, according to Industry Ministry sources. Nevertheless, the employers' union FICE and the sector unions have hammered out a reconversion plan that they have just submitted to the administration.

Paper companies will also soon be submitting their plan, which entails little social cost since the measures to be taken are technological and specialization-related. "This is a sector in which we have the basic element, the raw material, and in which we could develop a very competitive industry at the European level," Aldama pointed out.

The only private companies included in the revamping plan are Femsa and Robert Bosch Espana, because the administration wants to keep the German multinational Robert Bosch in Spain and to promote a Spanish automotive electric components industry. The two concerns have agreed to merge under the name of Femsa and have just hammered out an overhaul agreement with the unions that calls for 1,700 layoffs, a 9 percent wage boost over the next 2 years and increases in capital. The administration has already conducted its studies and, with the millions it has available, has cut off the reconversion list at 11 sectors; thus, plans have yet to be drafted for capital goods, common steels and heavy foundry. "The approach to revamping has been to restrict, but not in the sense of erecting barriers. We are leaving the door open for some other sector to enter in the future. For the time being, however, we feel that all of the ones that cught to be included are," Enrique Aldama pointed out.

Four basic criteria have been followed for selecting the sectors: sectors that are major courses of the position, that produce basic items or that have major future prospects. The decision as to whether a sector is or is not put on the reconversion list (with an antitlement to government aid) is made by an interministerial committee, and "registration" is open until 31 December 1982, although no nearly electronics and compensately majorities and copper industries plan to file, as well as, pecked, that it is a factilizers. In all of these sectors, with their industrial coals in its in, the sim is to adjust supply and enhance competitivity. This means taking steps to scale back production costs (wages

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and social, energy and technological outlays) and to place companies on a sound financial footing (capital formation and cutting financing costs), as well as other measures to boost investment, enhance trade policy and update technology. All of this is necessary because of our forthcoming membership in the EEC.

To achieve this, the sacrifices have to be apportioned among companies (shareholders), workers (layoffs and low wages) and the State (through the budget and public funds, as well as tax breaks and financial aid). "We feel that 70 percent of the excess manpower, which we estimate at between 10 and 12 percent of the payrolls, can exit in a nontraumatic way, through early retirement, voluntary resignations and disabilities," commented Enrique Aldama. As far as the government's efforts are concerned, the overhaul will cost a total of 570 billion pesetas.

"The cost of the overhaul in new money is 11.1 billion pesetas in 1981. The remainder are allocations that were already earmarked for the crisis-ridden sectors, but in an unorganized fashion, without any plan. The largest amount, the cost of replenishing the capital of public enterprises that were losing money, was already allocated; government loans are for the amounts that were already provided for, and there has only been a 6.6 billion increase in Industry and 4.5 billion in Labor," Aldama explained.

It remains to be seen what the cost of not overhauling these sectors will be. "It is impossible to evaluate the losses in terms of jobs, orders, reductions in tax revenues and Social Security receipts, and increased imports and dependence that a failure to act would entail. And we have to keep in mind that by 1985 (some of them before) these sectors will have to stop posting losses and become competitive internationally," Industry Undersecretary Enrique Aldama said in conclusion.

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POLITICAL

SPAIN

CENTRIFUGAL FORCES WITHIN UCD DESCRIBED

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 3 Aug 81 pp 18-21

[Text] Amid a major upheaval in the UCD [Democratic Center Union], triggered when the faction calling itself the Moderate Platform, backed by the signatures of 39 "rebel" deputies, went public, President Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo began pulling the strings for an ambitious plan designed to build what he himself described as a "modernized" UCD. Deputy Alfonso Osorio and Antonio Garrigues Walker, along with Matias Rodriguez Inciarte, the assistant to the president, and Luis Sanchez Merlo, Calvo Sotelo's two main political and economic advisers, met for dinner on Friday 24 July with Calvo Sotelo at Rodriguez Iniciarte's house on the outskirts of Madrid. Osorio, a Christian Democrat politician with close ties to the Moderate Platform through Oscar Alzaga, its main booster, and to the entire "clan" of that ideology in the UCD, whose leaders he brought into the first Suarez administration in 1976 when he assumed the vice presidency, seems prepared to rejoin the revamped UCD that his friend Calvo Sotelo is planning. It would be a party of well-defined "sectors," "clans," factions" or "branches" with their own heads, in spite of the latest statement by the UCD Executive Committee, which Sugrez and his men have majority control of. The committee rejected the formation of organized factions, though those attending the Tuesday 28 July meeting acknowledged that this was a purely political issue, rejecting any disciplinary measure against the members of the Moderate Platform. Calvo Sotelo is planning a UCD staff with representative "barons" and with inherent influence in the party. The men that Calvo Sotelo will be bringing into this middle-of-the-road venture, which he hopes to head up at the forthcoming general election, according to reports received by CAMBIO 16, include in addition to Osorio, the liberal Antonio Garrigues, who is seen by Moncloa as the head of this political clan, Jose Maria de Areilza, the chairman of the Council of Europe, and Jose Maria Lopez de Letona, the president of the Bank of Madrid, a former minister and an influential man in financial and business circles.

The program, which is expected to take from 6 to 8 months, also includes other well-known figures from the world of politics, economics and letters in the centrist group.

At the very moment that has are sent our over the belongues, the main booster of the move to establish a faction that identifies with the ideology of Christian Democracy, Oscal Alzaga, was meeting in private with the president of the government, Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, at Moncloa Palace.

Speaking firmly and with a nervous look on his face, Alzaga, one of the youngest centrist leaders, explained to the president why a wideranging ideological debate had to be initiated in the party to clarify the position and standing of the various forces in it.

His support for Calvo Sotelo was, of course, a sure thing, but the party leadership and machinery was something else again.

Alzaga reportedly analyzed the situation in which the UCD finds itself, reaching conclusions that are disquieting for the party. What the promotor of the faction that emerged with the name Moderate Platform, backed by the signatures of 39 legislators, stressed the most was the UCD loss of ground in areas as decisive as Andalusia, Catalonia, Madrid, the Basque Country and conceivably Galicia.

The drifting away of the electorate and the "ruinous" (the word used by one of the signers of Platform document) management of the party machine headed by Agustin Rodriguez Sahagun, are the basic motives for calling for an "overhaul" of the centrist movement in terms of ideology and structure.

In the background there is a dramatic confrontation, which is coming to light more and more each day, between former President Adolfo Suarez and the current head of government. The former controls most of the party "machinery"; Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo holds power and authority from his first 4 months at the head of the Executive Branch.

It was almost 2000 hours on Friday 24 July when Oscar Alzaga left Moncloa Palace, just minutes before the first guests arrived at the "party" arranged by Calvo Sotelo in the Moncloa gardens before taking off on vacation. Then came the dinner with his colleagues and Osorio and Garrigues.

As Alzaga crossed in front of the car in which the party president, Rodriguez Sahagun, was riding, the latter was talking on the phone with his cabinet chief, Fernando Lanzaco, who was telling him about the news that was coming in and about the flood of calls from newsmen who wanted to know what the reaction at the highest echelon was.

The fact was that the move by the 39 rebels had taken the form of a letter-document addressed to Rodriguez Sahagun himself.

Rodriguez Sahagun's first reaction was to downplay the matter, which in reality represented a challenge to the current leadership of the UCD, and to point to the statements in the letter of the 39 expressing support for Calvo Sotelo and the UCD program and calling for a move towards the electorate. Pursuing this strategy, the party's secretary general, Rafael Calvo Ortega, after conversing with Rodriguez Sahagun at the Moncloa get-together, prudently underscored that "the document of the 39 supports Calvo Sotelo and defends the UCD electoral program."

But the move had too much of an impact during the first 24 hours for them to continue pursuing this strategy, and after meeting the next day, Saturday, with

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members of the Executive Committee linked to Suarez, Rodriguez Sahagun threatened disciplinary action against the people who had set up a faction within the party. Both Oscar Alzaga and Miguel Herrero de Minon, another of the Platform's main proponents, denied publicly that the move was designed to break up the UCD.

Over the next few days, the offensive by the 39 was followed up in articles and statements to the press. The "rebels" favorite target was Social Democrat Francisco Fernandez Ordonez.

At his home in Santa Pola, Alicante, the justice minister told CAMBIO 16:
"A clarification will be needed. Parties are like a bottle of wine whose label says Burgundy but that contains vinegar. The contents are the important thing."

Most of the 39 rebels are Christian Democrats, as is the case with Fernando Alvarez de Miranda, Manuel Diaz Pines, Jose Antonio Esperabe de Arteaga, Luis Vega Escandon, former Minister Manuel Otero Novas or Oscar Alzaga himself.

Nonetheless, both these and other prominent leaders of the UCD who belong to this same political family and that support the move by the 39 from the outside, such as Ministers Inigo Cavero, Jose Luis Alvarez or Marcelino Oreja himself (see page 22), reject the term Christian Democracy in favor of Christian humanism and say no to the idea of firming a party outside the UCD with that ideology.

The fact is that in these outreach maneuvers within the UCD we are witnessing a struggle for power through ideological control.

"We are the essence of the UCD," said Otero Novas, while circles closest to the 39 mentioned the presence within and outside the Platform of well-known figures with very closely linked political careers, as is the case with the most prominent figures in the Christian Democratic faction and men like Enrique de la Mata who have been together in the "Tacito" group since the early 1970's.

The appearance of the Moderate Platform, which in turn was attacked by Fernandez Ordonez's men as an attempt to form a major right-wing coalition with AP [Popular Alliance] leader Manuel Fraga, marks the return of ideological factions to the UCD. They never actually disappeared, but as of this week they are official again. Some people go further and think that the only way out will be a return to one original coalition system under which the UCD emerged. This is a prescription that most of the UCD "barons" reject.

Reports gathered by CAMBIO 16 from completely reliable sources indicate that a return to a condition in what four Alzaga is proposing as a viable solution for the centrist critis. The main disagraement between Oscar Alzaga and other leading members of the off Christian Democrats, such as Landelino Lavilla, Marcelino Oreja...is that the latter reject the idea of a coalition and a pact with Fraga leading to the so-called "big right wing."

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In any case, the people in the UCD are genuinely anxious to see Calvo Sotelo's programs and to consider the possibility of reaching the "big pact" among the various factions and figures with their own intrinsic influence.

The Liberals Lagging Behind

The move by the Christian Democrats has a concerted parallel in the liberal faction, which for the moment, both inside and outside the UCD, is revolving around various poles and considering a move to the progressive right.

In recent weeks there had been a series of meetings between the promoters of the Moderate Platform, with Christian Democrats Oscar Alzaga and Miguel Herrero in the lead, and liberals Eduardo Merigo, Antonio Fontan, Joaquin Munoz Peirata, Soledad Becerril...to undertake unified action.

The liberals said "no."

In statements to CAMBIO 16, Merigo himself placed Alzaga and Herrero de Minon in a conservative faction of the UCD. "We're not over there, nor in what could be called the populist faction, where Adolfo Suarez and Fernandez Ordonez are: with a liberal ideology and including other men close to this faction but who do not define themselves as such. We occupy our own space in the UCD," Eduardo Merigo told this magazine.

In Valencia, where former Vice President Fernando Abril has followed the conservative right-wing tack at all costs, liberal Deputy Joaquin Munoz Peirats is holding up the party's progressive torch.

"It's inconceivable for positions as conservative as what is happening in Valencia to exist in the UCD," Munoz Peirats told CAMBIO 16, "and we liberals are going to fight this."

On the whole, the liberal "clan" firmly supports President Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, and the definitive emergence of a platform in the UCD like the one offered by the young Christian Democrats would entail the organization of ideological alternatives within the party, including the liberal faction.

The various political liberals whom this magazine has contacted have agreed, moreover, that their boundary line on the left is the PSOE barrier, a boundary that they are not prepared to cross, although they do not rule out the possibility of participating in a coalition government with the PSOE if such a prospect would ever come to pass.

This analysis, which was outlined with quite a few points of agreement by well-known figures of varying stripes within the liberal "clan," contains the implicit charge that Fernandez Ordonez, the minister of justice and head of the UCD's Social Democratic faction, is trying to place himself in the PSOE's political space.

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The dominant idea among UCD liberals is to bring together the party's various factions. "The point is to strengthen the UCD, not break it up," Eduardo Merigo told this magazine, though the young liberal reiterated his suggestion that the UCD run in the forthcoming election as the most important element in a coalition in which other well-known political figures, Jose Maria de Areilza and Antonio Garrigues Walker, among others, would participate.

To another UCD liberal, former Minister Jose Luis Leal, who explained that he does not belong to any faction, the best solution to the UCD's current crisis is to bolster the party through a genuine ideological debate.

Leal, who according to his statements to CAMBIO 16 is not in favor of reestablishing or formalizing factions within the UCD or having it return to its coalition roots, feels that the government party should engage in debate and close ranks without causing any ideological faction to lose its identity.

In Leal's analysis, the key is to reconcile the factions between the UCD's most conservative faction (which has been taking unequivocally democratic positions lately, however) and the most progressive faction (where he places himself), which advocates social change through genuine ideological debate.

The new twist is unquestionably the definitive startup of what is known as "Operation Liberal," headed up by Antonio Garrigues Walker, for whom a leap into the political arena is just a matter of time, before the upcoming general election, however.

The move has the backing of Ambassador Antonio Garrigues and Diaz Canabate, who on the anniversary of his son Joaquin's death told CAMBIO 16: "The liberal clubs that my son promoted are based on the notion of liberalism that Joaquin defended so strongly."

From his businessman's and lawyer's vantage point, Antonio Garrigues is currently starting the first phase of "Operation Liberal," which consists of building a liberal infrastructure throughout the country through the clubs that have begun to open up. The Madrid club was followed by ones in Palma de Mallorca, Toledo and Gijon. "We plan to have 20 completely set up throughout Spain by the end of the year, at the rate of 1 or 2 a week as of September," Antonio Carriguez told CAMBIO 16.

The estimated cost for the project as a whole is 200 million pesetas over the next 2 years. Almost all of it is earmarked for infrastructure (offices, pay for managers, secretaries, services...), with an estimated 16 to 18 million pesetas for each one of the clubs in the three major cities (Madrid, Barcelona and Bilbao) and between 5 and 7 million for the others.

According to Antonio Carri, es, each of one of the clubs will be self-financing, which marks the beginning of a management procedure that he would like to introduce into Spanish politics.

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Antonio Garrigues denies that the liberal clubs are a "political operation," although he concedes that they do have "political consequences."

Garrigues stressed to this magazine, however, that "the clubs will be permanent" and that their target is those intermediate groups in society that want to get involved in public life but without joining a party.

In any case, the infrastructure of the clubs will be the springboard by which Garrigues and many of the liberal figures who do not now belong to the UCD will make as strong a leap as possible into the political ring, now that the general election is approaching.

Another meeting of the liberal clubs (the first two were in July) has been organized for late September in the Galician town of La Toja, in an initial bid to support locally his ideological positions in an election contest. In this regard, it is no accident that the meeting coincides with a regional parliament election campaign in full swing.

The liberal clubs and the active presence of UCD members, including men like former Minister Eduardo Punset, Deputy Joaquin Munoz Peirats or Eduardo Merigo himself, are encountering strong resistance among centrist ranks.

Some well-known UCD figures, such as Minister Rodolfo Martin Villa, have come out against what they regard as dual membership and accuse the clubs of being a "parapolitical" organization, while the estrangement between Antonio Garrigues and liberals Ignacio Camunas and Antonio Fontan is obvious, as the promotor of the clubs acknowledged to this magazine.

It was Antonio de Senillosa, a Democratic Coalition deputy, who described himself as a liberal "and very proud of it" and then came out in defense of the "clubs," "associations" and "foundations."

"If someone tells me that the clubs, associations and foundations should not engage in politics, I will respect that opinion, but I will question it."

"Keep in mind," Senillosa went on to say, "that these associations almost always emerge as groups of intellectuals and politicians, which means that they contain the seeds if not of a party, at least of its epicenter."

Countering the suspicions and accusations, Garrigues himself categorically denied to this magazine that "Operation Liberal" by the clubs was aimed at the UCD, noting that the government party's problems came from within, not from the outside.

Garrigues asserted that in any case between 40 and 50 percent of UCD liberals back the clubs program, although he feels that the actual support would be much greater.

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After conversing with Antonio Garrigues and listening to his analyses of the political situation in Spain and his plans, one comes to the conclusion that he clearly advocates an autonomous liberal force on the political spectrum.

"Here in Spain we have to move towards an ideological clarification, like in the rest of Europe, where the liberal, Social Democratic and Christian Democratic forces are quite well-defined," Antonio Garrigues asserted.

Garrigues's ultimate objective is to secure the recognition of the Liberal International and to establish close cooperation with the Liberal parties of the FRG and Great Britain.

But the immediate method of political involvement on the part of Antonio Garrigues and other liberal figures who are not in the UCD is going to be largely determined by political circumstances over the next few months.

The fact is that the liberal "clam" as a whole is not the only faction awaiting President Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo's decision concerning the UCD or the centrist group that he might head up; all of the factions in this political zone are anxiously looking forward to it.

Their expectations are not exaggerated because in this case the future of Spain's right wing and the political stability of the country itself are at stake.

Calvo Sotelo is looking at four options for resolving the party's crisis: continue tolerating the current tensions with a parliamentary minority; strengthen the party and create alliances to secure a majority along with other forces; head up a coalition comprising all or almost all UCD factions but with new men and groups brought in, and finally, bring together the various UCD factions based on a unity pledge and by bringing in new men and groups. According to the reports we have heard, the latter option is the one that Calvo Sotelo is working on.

His colleagues and a number of ministers are saying that an outcome to this complex situation will take more definitive shape within the next 30 days, during which time Calvo Sotelo will be holding top-echelon meetings in Ribadeo, his vacation site in Galicia, with the main leaders of the party and of other groups close to it.

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MILITARY

BELGIUM

JOURNAL HITS MILITARY PROCUREMENT, DEFENSE POLICY

Negligent Defense Ministers

Brussels POURQUOI PAS? in French 23/29 Jul 81 pp 14-15

[Text] When VDB [Vanden Boeynants] left his position as defense minister, everyone could say that he had skillfully maneuvered his ship and negotiated a difficult passage, with 5 years of rich experience. As for the army, it remained stuck in the middle of the ford.... Since then, nonexistent ministers have taken turns trying to get that heavy military vehicle out of the mire. With no results. In fact, Desmarets, Poswick, and Swaelen confined themselves to throwing life-buoys into the middle of the stream, shouting encouragement, but without a precise idea as to an approachable bank.

In reality, these gentlemen knew, as do you and I, that what is necessary is to turn back and return to general, effective, and extended military service. But none of them wanted to say that out loud. We still hope that a successor will be found to get matters unstuck....

Meanwhile, as we wait for that Godot, the successor-martyr, the man who will restore mandatory 15-month military service, the crowd must be kept entertained.

This is what the present minister is doing, engaging us with his "10-year investment plan for national defense." A long list of acquisitions, which are ritually submitted for the government's approval. A dismal tale of lots of pennies.

All the same, let us glance at this famous plan. We learn in it that programs under way are progressing normally for the acquisition of equipment such as GUEPARD, CVRT, HELIP, RITA, MILAN, VBCI.... Wait a minute! Let's say it in proper words: anti-aircraft tanks, armored reconnaissance vehicles, surface-to-air missiles, trans mitting systems, anti-tank rockets, armored infantry vehicles, not to forget the mine chasers and frigates of the navy, or the air force's F-16's and armored taupinieres [personnel carriers]. That is all very good.

Under the heading of extravagances to come, we learn that the army will have its high-frequency radios, that the artillery can hope for its new cannons, that the F-16's will get some munitions (not much, but at last something...) within a reasonable time. As for the rest, we will have to wait a few years: combat helicopters,

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infantry mortars, replacement Mirages, VHF radios, SHORAD (airport defense) missiles, medium-range anti-tank missiles, replacement NIKE rockets, replacement tanks, anti-tank munitions, artillery rocket-launchers, and...a complement of F-15 weaponry, all that stretched out between 1984 and 1990...if the Russians wre willing to leave us alone until then.

All the same, the whole thing represents a nice sum in the billions, staggered over the next 10 years. A real effort! An effort that is far greater than some people imagine. For example, Belgium will obligingly pay its share for the famous AWACS, the NATO radar-aircraft. If only we had raised our voices to say that we would not participate in such a foolish outlay, the utility of which was not evident* and for which there was no compensation.... However, in the last analysis, we are paying without a murmur. Was that fine indignation, then, only an act? Idle talk about NATO?

All that aside, this great financial effort should not blind us to the main point. Namely: we find pennies to buy equipment (costly and sophisticated), but we do not find the men to use it. The army remains under-strength. Worse: it does not have the means to correctly train and educate its soldiers. The noncommissioned officers are now commanding skeleton units composed of under-trained, over-unionized "professionals." Personnel costs too much, there is not much left for operating expenses.

That being the case, what use are the prodigious programs, the ultra-modern armaments? Such an army would be wiped out, quite obviously, by a good Afghan or Vietnamese infantry armed with pikes and cudgels! These latter, you see, are motivated—and know how to use their equipment!

The basis of the problem is the "middle of the stream." It is the failure of professionalization, which has been obvious for 3 years now.

The rub of the question is that we must announce a return to 15-month military service. A democratic measure (forget about the army as a career!), an economical measure (compulsory military service reduces costs), an effective measure (one militiaman is worth three "volunteers"), and an opportune measure (we would finally eliminate unemployment among our youth, which is tragic for all of us). But above all: an unpopular measure! So who is going to announce it to the nation? Not me, murmured Poswick. Not me, sighs Swaelen today. Therefore, time must be bought, by the traditional method: studying the problem in committees.

Alas! That expedient is drawing to its end. The joint commission on national defense is making haste slowly, but at last it is going to report its conclusions. Already, it has submitted its report on the question of fuel (asking for an additional 541 million) and the government had to free up 400 million....

Already, the joint commission chaired by Marshall Cudell and including political, military and "diverse" technical types, has arrived at some inevitable conclusions. General Contier himself, despite all his caution, was not able to hide the sad truth. Namely: that the operational capability of the land army is slipping toward

^{*} The utility of the AWACS appears now to be less than previously thought. For example, why did the American radar-aircraft based in Saudi Arabia fail to detect the Israeli jets headed toward Tamuz? Nelsonian myopia?

zero; that the navy can barely navigate; that the air force itself is beginning to suffer.... And, finally, that every 15-month militiaman would save us one "volunteer" (Francs 400,000 per year) or one unemployed worker (Francs 448,000). So?

So, in 3 or 4 months, the commission is going to present its report. Mr Swaelen will then have to dismantle the heritage of VDB, the legacy of the Great Pontificate. Oh, oh! What a painful prospect!

Bah! One must never despair. Four months is a long time.... Perhaps Mr Swaelen will by then have had the time to find himself a successor?

Problems With Equipment

Brussels POURQUOI PAS? in French 23/29 Jul 81 p 15

[Text] The COBRA armored vehicle, of the ACEC [Charleroi Electrical Engineering Shops], has completed its various tests. They are said to have disclosed a disastrously fragile engine, inadequately developed. In August, the general acquisitions service will submit its report to the minister. Will the decision in September be to buy the 150 vehicles? Or perhaps a final scrapping of that purchase order, which would miraculously cut the (anticipated) 3 billion it was to cost the defense budget? Do not weep, carolos [Charleville inhabitants] deputies: in any case, the biggest piece of the action was to have profited factories located in Flanders.

Within the navy, like everywhere else, people's backs are up while they wait for better times. So much the better if they get a few pennies to be able to sail one of their four beautiful frigates: the "Westdiep" will perhaps go to rejoin the STANAVFORLANT squadron. As for the dredgers, they will do a little sailing to pass the time. Meanwhile, the Ostende shipyard is preparing actively for the building of a minesweep...in 1985. A country is never small when it borders the ocean. Everything is going well for the armorers. At Herstal, ships are constantly being dressed. NATO has ordered 5.56-mm caliber SS-109 munitions from the FN [expansion unknown]. And, of course, FN's weapons are the best designed to fire the said munitions. Then, the Swedish army has ordered the marvelous FN-C, that toy rifle for which the world is so envious of us. And the Americans are opting for the "Minimi," a darling of a small, light machinegun, "the dream of the modern soldier," (dixit FN). Once again, we are going to export our beautiful gadgets (or sell the licenses) all over the planet. It was tiresome to see nothing but Kalachnikovs around lately....

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MILITARY

FRANCE

DEFENSE MINISTER DISCUSSES NATIONAL SERVICE REFORM

PM171506 Paris PARIS MATCH in French 14 Aug 81 p 90

[Interview with French Defense Minister Charles Hernu by Laurence Masurel: "Military Service: There Will Be a Great Debate Before It Is Reformed"--date and place not given]

[Text] [Question] Many French people were shocked when you stated that the armed forces should serve "France and socialism." Do you still think that?

[Answer] That is not exactly what I said. I said that they should serve France and I added with reference to national service and specifying that I was talking as a socialist and not as a minister, that as far as some young people were concerned France could be served better under a leftwing government. It is clear—and to discover this you just have to reread all the books I have written over the past 23 years—that I think the armed forces' role is above all to defend the republic and the nation, in other words France as a whole.

[Question] Imagine Mr Bourges or Mr Galley saying that the armed forces should serve "advanced liberalism." How would you have reacted?

[Answer] Mr Galley certainly did so since he stated in the National Assembly that the armed forces were "the last bastion of the liberal society." That brought a reply from Socialist Deputy Alain Savary who protested this assimilation of the armed forces with the defense of an ideology.

[Question] Do you think the armed forces should be the armed forces of the "people's deterrent," as you said?

[Answer] I did not say that, although this idea of "nuclear and people's deterrent" was used by my colleague Jean-Pierre Chevenement. I prefer the idea of "people's mobilization."

[Question] Which means?

[Answer] My view is one of overall defense. In the crisis-ridden society in which we live, we must fight on all fronts: when our agricultural food industry threatens to collapse, when the computer industry is in a bad way, when we are in danger of losing our aeronautics industry, in short when we are in danger of losing

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our vital industries, it is as if we were losing military battles. They are real defeats. What kind of military defense would France have if all its industry were controlled by multinationals, or if it had lost all its brains? My ministry, which is a unique case, in that it employs 750,000 people, is also taking part and will take part in the fight against unemployment by job creation. Similarly my ministerial colleagues are also defending France.

[Question] There is reportedly some malaise in the armed forces and their general staffs owing to the many changes which have been made (four ministers and three chiefs of staff in 1 year). Is this true?

[Answer] The fact that there has been a rapid succession of ministers has nothing to do with me. In any case no chief of staff has been changed since I have been in this job. Everybody has remained in his post. When I submit appointments or changes to the cabinet my criteria are quite simply those of ability and the promotion table. The military in charge have followed the orders they received from the government in office. Therefore there is no reason to hold them responsible. Is there some malaise? I do not think so. This report is being spread by a bitter right which would like that to be the case. Ah: How nice it would be if some military chief were to resign. Ah: How nice it would be if mutinous movements were to start in the armed forces. Well, that is not happening.

[Question] Nonetheless it is said that general or senior officers fear the politicization of the armed forces....

[Answer] If officers think that, let them write and tell me.

[Question] Are you going to reduce the length of military service as some people thought?

[Answer] The content and efficacy of national service must be improved. For young men, serving your time must not amount to wasting your time. We must create a useful and responsible service and hence we envisage a number of reorganization measures. That cannot be done in a week. In the fall I will go and open a session of the "Army-Youth" Commission which will be attended by the trade union organizations, conscientious objectors, the human rights league, scouting organizations and, of course, military organizations. There will, therefore, be a great debate on this subject during which wide consultation will be established between the military and young people.

I am convinced that that will bring progress.

Nine months later we will report on our idea and thinking to the chief of the armed forces—the president of the republic.

[Question] What is the position on national service for women?

[Answer] I personally believe that voluntary service for women must be increased. There is a big demand for it. When we recruited 100 women as gendarmes we received more than 10,000 applications from young women.

[Question] With regard to recruit training, you said: "The officers and junior officers cannot be expected to do everything. It is important to enter the armed forces, after preparation by schools, secondary schools and universities. There must be close cooperation with the national education system." What are your ideas on this close cooperation?

[Answer] We need close cooperation not only with the National Education Ministry but also with the Ministries of Labor, Youth and Sports, National Solidarity and the Interior. How can young people be expected to feel the need to defend their country if they do not have a historical awareness of that country? It is, therefore, important to teach history in school just as it is important to try to be healthy and to develop civic education. The armed forces cannot do everything. Efforts must be made to train young people before and after the armed forces.

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GENERAL

FRANCE

SUCCESS OF THIRD ARIANE LAUNCHING CONFIRMED

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 18 Jul 81 pp 55, 64

/Article by Pierre Langereux7

_Text7 The CNES _National Center for Space Studies7 and the ESA _European Space Agency7 just published the official but still provisional conclusions of the third inflight test firing (LO3) of the "Ariane launcher, successfully completed on 19 June 1981 in Kourou, French Guyana.

There are apparently no surprises and the CNES is now working on the rating documents for the Ariane 1 launcher which will be discussed by a CNES-ESA rating committee before being submitted to the Executive Board of the Ariane program for its approval in September or October of 1981, or, in other words, before the fourth and final inflight test launch (LO4) scheduled for November 20.

The detailed examination of the results of the LO3 launch confirm the statements made after the preliminary analysis immediately following the 19 June launching. The LO3 launcher functioned perfectly and problems encountered during the first two launches were completely overcome and corrected.

The three stages of the launcher functioned perfectly, give or take a few seconds. This confirms the effectiveness of the corrections made to the Viking engines of the first and second stages to get rid of the high-frequency (2,300 and 2,700 Hz) combustion instability that destroyed the LO3 launcher in May 1980.

The Pogo effect, noted at the end of the second stage of the flight during the first LOI launching in December 1979 and caused by the rigidity of the N204 pipes, was eliminated by activating the Pogo device which made it possible to separate the vibrations of the engines and structures from those of the feeder circuits.

Finally, the slight pollution noted inside the nose cap during firing of the LO1 was reduced by moving the third phase retrorockets and by adding sealing valves to the nose cap.

An analysis of the firing of the LO3 also confirms a performance gain, which was already apparent during the first firing. In these conditions, the "nominal guaranteed performance in the reference orbit" (200-36,000 km., with an 8^o incline) is now 1,780 kg. This means that Ariane 1 can, without any difficulty launch the large Intelsat 5 satellites, which is the "test load" mission of the current European launcher.

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Reduced Pressure

We should add that this performance was obtained during firing of the LO3 with Viking engines operating under 53.5 bars of firing pressure, or less than the nominal pressure of 54.5 bars used for the first two firings.

The combustion pressure of the Viking engines was in fact deliberately lowered during the firing of the LO3 to increase the safety margin of the engine.

It therefore seems that the nominal guaranteed performance of Arian. 1 could be obtained with Viking engines operating under a reduced pressure of 53.5 bars, and maybe only 53 bars (instead of the 54.5 bars set initially as the Viking's nominal pressure for Ariane 1). A decision will be made on this subject after the next inflight test firing of the LO4 which will also be done with reduced pressure set nominally at 53.5 bars.

58 Bars for Ariane 3

However, the combustion pressure of the Viking engines will have to be increased considerably for the new Ariane 2 and 3 models which should in principle be available by the end of 1982 and mid-1983, respectively.

To obtain the performance planned for the Ariane 2 and 3 rockets, the new Viking engines will in fact have to operate under 58 bars of nominal pressure, which requires a rating of 64 bars of maximum pressure, and this of course without any combustion instability!

Now the previous modification (enlarging the injector holes) will not be sufficient to safely avoid combustion instability.

The CNES and the SEP /European Propellant Co.7 have therefore undertaken additional studies to improve the stability margin of the Viking so that it can operate under 58 bars of firing pressure.

Several solutions have been discussed: chemical additives in the ergols, baffles in the combustion chamber, reduction of the injection speed, etc.

The most promising solution now chosen is to inject an additive (hydrazine hydrate) in the fuel (UDMH) in order to change the size of the drops of ergol injected, which in turn reduces the sensitivity to combustion instability.

A Viking engine with a modified injector to operate on UDMH and hydrazine hydrate is now being tested at the Vernon test-bed and work is also going on to check the corrosion resistence of the ergol tanks and pipes under tension, in view of the additive.

These tests should give us information by September on the real operating range for the new Viking engine under 58 bars of pressure.

Improved Ariane 3 Model

The results of these tests are extremely important for the future of the European launcher, as the CNES is working on an improved model of the Ariane 3 launcher for 1984-85, in order to accommodate the increased size of future geostationary satellites (ECS, Telecom 1, Australisat, etc.), which will be using the European rocket.

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This new Ariane 3 S (Super 1) model will thus be able to carry two 1,195 kg. satellites and the Sylda dual lounching device (200 kg.), or a total payload of 2,590 kg. in synchronous transfer orbit. The Ariane 3 rocket is currently designed to launch two 1,140 kg. satellites (STS-PAM type), plus the Sylda, or a total of 2,480 kg.

To obtain this 110 kg. gain in the payload with the Ariane 3 S, the CNES is planning to lighten the equipment compartment and the third cryogenic H8 stage, and reduce the launcher's dispersion margins.

This means then that they have to be certain as to the Viking engines' operating potential at 58 bars. Otherwise, the improvements to be made with the Ariane 3 S would only offset the performance loss of the Viking, without any gain in payload.

Paradoxically, the future of the European launcher depends on the element that seems the least critical, namely the Viking engine!

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GENERAL FRANCE

'MARECS A' TELECOMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE LAUNCH DELAYED

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 18 Jul 81 p 55

/Article by Pierre Langereux/

Text7 The fourth and last inflight test firing of the European launcher Ariane has been delayed following difficulties that came up during the recent tests and the incorporation of ESA's MARECS A satellite, the main payload for this launching.

The LO4 launching is planned for November 20, 1981, while it had been set for October 1981. However, the final date won't be fixed for another week or two, before the end of July in principle, when they know how long it will take to resolve the MARECS A problems. We should point out that MARECS A is the first maritime telecommunications satellite built in Europe.

Whatever the date may be, MARECS A will be launched at night, for reasons related to putting the satellite into commission. This will be the first night firing of the Ariane launcher at Kourou. But this procedure will become routine later on, since a number of geostationary satellites require night launching because of the angle of the solar aspect of satellites, among other reasons.

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